Across the Country, Federal and State Courts have wrestled with the interpretation of a federal statute which could preempt state common law claims against brokers, carriers and freight forwarders. The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (“FAAAA”) provides that States “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier…, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 28 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) However, the Safety Exception of the FAAAA provides that the FAAAA “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 28 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).
In Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., et al. (2025), the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, issued a published opinion that expressly limits the broad application of the Safety Exception to the FAAAA in California State Courts. The Court of Appeals held that the FAAAA preempted plaintiff’s negligence cause of action, and it was not saved by the Safety Exception because the state law cause of action did not have the requisite ‘direct connection’ between the state law and a motor vehicle. This result diverges from that of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (9th Cir. 2020) 976 F.3d 1016 (“Miller”). In Miller, the plaintiff sued a broker for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle incident with a tractor trailer, alleging that the broker’s selection of a motor carrier was negligent. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the FAAAA preempted the claim, but that it was saved by the Safety Exception based on a presumption against preemption, and because “negligence claims against brokers, to the extent that they arise out of motor vehicle accidents, have the requisite ‘connection with’ motor vehicles.”
Casarez arose from a motor vehicle incident involving a motor vehicle and a tractor trailer that resulted in the passing of the driver of the motor vehicle. The driver of the tractor trailer was subsequently charged with vehicular manslaughter and his ‘extreme fatigue’ was deemed a contributing factor to the occurrence of the incident. An action was brought by the decedent’s mother, wherein she alleged causes of action for motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and wrongful death against the shipper and receiver of the goods being hauled by the tractor trailer. Defendants (Shippers) were granted summary judgment on the grounds that the FAAAA preempted the state law causes of action and were not saved by the Safety Exception.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the Trial Court’s judgments. In doing so, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the holding of Miller, finding the ‘rationale deficient’ for several reasons. First, the Miller Court’s presumption against preemption was a mistake because the FAAAA contains an express preemption clause, and with an express preemption clause, there is a presumption of preemption. Second, the Miller Court’s interpretation conflicts with United States Supreme Court precedent which provides that ‘related to’ is to be construed more broadly, and ‘with respect to’ is to be construed more restrictively. Miller’s holding had the effect of allowing state law claims that had a direct or indirect connection between the state law and a motor vehicle to satisfy the Safety Exception, essentially dispensing with the preemptive effect of the FAAAA all together.
The Court of Appeal in Casarez clarified the State Court’s interpretation and application of the express preemption of the FAAAA. The FAAAA “applies so long as the claim (1) derives from the enactment or enforcement of a state law and (2) relates to the prices, routes, or services of a motor carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” The Safety Exception applies only when there is “a direct connection between the state law and motor vehicles.” Allowing otherwise “enables the safety exception to swallow the preemption clause.” Specifically, the Court of Appeal held that because the petitioner’s claims did not “purport the tractor trailer itself was defective or otherwise unsafe” the Safety Exception did not apply.
This decision diverts California State Courts from the position taken by the Ninth Circuit in Miller. In so doing, this decision clarifies the requisite connection between a state law and a motor vehicle for the Safety Exception to apply in California State Courts, which has the effect of limiting its application.
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