On June 7, 2016, in Alice Mendoza v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (USCA 9th No. 14-55651 (“Mendoza”), the Ninth Circuit held that under the Americans with Disabilities Act, an employee alleging disability discrimination and disparate treatment claims must show “that a discriminatory animus is the sole reason for the challenged action” or that the legitimate reason proffered for the employer’s action is merely pre textual for discrimination.
In its ruling, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the recent United States Supreme Court decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015) which held that a plaintiff in a Title VII action alleging disparate treatment only needs to show that the request for accommodation “was a factor” motivating the employer’s actions. The Ninth Circuit held that under Title VII, discrimination can be proven whether or not the employee asked for an accommodation. Knowledge is not a requirement of a Title VII claim. By contrast, under an ADA claim, an employer must have actual knowledge of an employee’s physical or mental limitations.
In Mendoza, Alice Mendoza was a full-time bookkeeper for a small Catholic parish church in Los Angeles. She took sick leave for ten months, during which time the church’s pastor took over Ms. Mendoza’s duties and “determined that the job could be done by a part-time bookkeeper.” When Ms. Mendoza returned from sick leave, she was told that her previous position had been eliminated. She was offered instead a part-time bookkeeping position. Ms. Mendoza declined the part-time position and subsequently sued for disability discrimination and disparate treatment claims. The defendant church moved for summary judgment in the District Court arguing that Mendoza failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the church’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not returning Mendoza to full-time work (the elimination of the full time bookkeeper position) was pre textual for a discriminatory reason. The District Court granted the church’s motion and Ms. Mendoza appealed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment. It found the church’s decision to eliminate Ms. Mendoza’s position was for legitimate reasons. Ms. Mendoza failed to show the church’s decision was motivated in any way to discriminate against her for having taken sick leave, or that she was treated differently. In holding against Ms. Mendoza, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that in an ADA case, the plaintiff must prove his or her case by showing either that the employer’s actions were directly related to the employee’s disability, or, if the employer provides a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action against the employee, that the employer also had a second discriminatory motive.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision reaffirms the burdens in ADA discrimination and accommodation claims and confirms that if an employer introduces evidence that its failure to accommodate a disabled worker was for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, the employee must show that the non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the employer are merely “pretextual” and that the primary motivation for the employer’s actions was in fact discriminatory. The decision also affirms a substantial difference concerning the burden of proof in ADA and Title VII claims. Under an ADA claim, “animus” or ill-will must be proven. In the latter, discrimination can be shown even if the employer has no actual knowledge of a particular employee’s need for an accommodation. For employers, the Mendoza decision is a reminder that under the ADA, any change to a disabled worker’s position must be for legitimate, non-pretextual reasons, and that the law’s accommodation requirements require employers to seek alternative positions if the disabled worker’s initial position is no longer available or was eliminated. Only when no alternative position is truly available may employers offer the disabled employee a “lesser” position or terminate the employee.
This document is intended to provide you with information about employment and labor law related developments. The contents of this document are not intended to provide specific legal advice. This communication may be considered advertising in some jurisdictions.