In Wassmann v. South Orange County Community College District, No. G053411, published June 12, 2018, the California Court of Appeal held that an employee was barred from bringing an Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim by the two-year Statute of Limitations Period.
On March 29, 2010, following a series of disputes between Ms. Wassmann, a tenured librarian, and several South Orange County Community College District (the District) employees, the District issued a Notice to Correct Deficiencies to Ms. Wassmann. When Ms. Wassmann’s conduct did not improve, the District issued a Statement of Charges against Ms. Wassmann wherein the District recommended Ms. Wassmann’s dismissal for unprofessional conduct. Although the District offered to aid in Ms. Wassmann’s professional development, she declined the offer. On March 28, 2011, the District’s board of trustees authorized a “Statement of Decision to Dismiss” Ms. Wassmann for unprofessional conduct, unsatisfactory conduct, and evident unfitness for service. On April 7, 2011, Ms. Wassmann filed a Notice of Objection to the Statement of Charges. Ms. Wassmann was officially dismissed from her employment on April 28, 2011.
Ms. Wassmann requested a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings to contest her employment termination. In August 2012, the administrative law judge upheld the District’s decision to dismiss Wassmann from employment. Ms. Wassmann challenged the administrative law judge’s decision in October 2012 by filing a writ of mandate in the superior court which was denied by the superior court in August 2013.
Following this denial, Wassmann obtained a right to sue notice from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) in December 2013, which was more than one year from her employment termination, and filed suit in December 2013. In her complaint, Ms. Wassmann alleged causes of action for racial discrimination, age discrimination, and harassment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), intentional infliction of emotional distress, and two other causes of action. Wassmann alleged she suffered emotional distress beginning in July 2009 and continuing until Wassmann’s termination in April 2011.
The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by the District Defendants and the individual District employees on the ground the FEHA claims were barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action was barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the statute of limitations.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision. Most notably, the Court of Appeal found that because Wassmann’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a common law claim, she was not required to obtain a right to sue notice from the DFEH. The Court of Appeal further explained that the statute of limitations was not equitably tolled while the administrative proceeding was pending because the “employee can simultaneously pursue statutory and common law remedies.” Since Ms. Wassmann failed to bring her cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress within two years of the time at which the cause of action accrued, this cause of action was barred by the two year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1.
This ruling is a reminder to employers to pay particular attention to the claims asserted in a DFEH claim and be cognizant of the applicable statute of limitations not only for the DFEH claims but any claims that are not subject to tolling.
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