Employer’s Refusal To Allow Rescission of an Employee’s Voluntary Resignation Does Not Constitute Adverse Employment Action Under the FEHA

In Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, (No. B275225, filed 4/19/17), the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District held absent evidence an employee’s resignation was coerced, an employer’s refusal to allow that employee to rescind his or her resignation is not an adverse employment action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).

In Featherstone plaintiff was an employee of Southern California Permanente Medical Group (SCPMG). While employed, plaintiff took a brief medical leave to undergo surgery for an ongoing sinus condition. Upon return from her medical leave, plaintiff had an adverse reaction to a post-op medication which allegedly caused her to suffer from an “altered mental state.” While under the influence of this altered mental state, plaintiff resigned from her position at SCPMG, both verbally in a discussion with her direct supervisor, and then again in writing, three days later. Shortly after providing her written resignation, plaintiff requested SCPMG allow her to rescind her resignation and SCPMG refused. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit asserting SCPMG’s refusal constituted unlawful disability discrimination in violation of the FEHA. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the SCPMG.

On appeal, the Featherstone court affirmed, finding SCPMG’s “refusal to allow plaintiff to rescind her resignation was not an adverse employment action under the FEHA” and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether SCPMG “knew of her alleged temporary disability at the time they accepted and processed her resignation.”

Specifically, the Court found refusing to allow a former employee to rescind a “voluntary discharge,” that is a resignation free of employer coercion or misconduct, is not an adverse employment action. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028 in which the California Supreme Court defined an adverse employment action generally as one that “materially affects the terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” The Court reasoned the existence of an active employment relationship was a prerequisite to an adverse action affecting such employment. It explained “an adverse employment action is one that affects an employee, not a former employee, in the terms, conditions or privileges of his or her employment, not in the terms, conditions or privileges of his or her unemployment.” The Featherstone court noted the FEHA itself is silent with respect to whether an employer’s refusal to allow a former employee to rescind a resignation constitutes an adverse employment action. However, it relied on pertinent federal precedent interpreting the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) and Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provided “refusing to accept rescission of a resignation is not an adverse employment action for the simple reason that the employment relationship has ended.”

The Court further found there was no evidence suggesting SCPMG forced the plaintiff’s resignation by coercion or duress, nor was SCPMG contractually obligated to permit rescission of the plaintiff’s resignation as she was an “at-will” employee. Lastly, the Featherstone court found when plaintiff resigned, SCPMG did not, actually or constructively, perceive that plaintiff was suffering from a temporary disability caused by an adverse drug reaction. Instead, SCPMG did not learn plaintiff suffered from the alleged temporary disability until after she tendered her resignation and that resignation had been accepted, i.e., after plaintiff ceased being an employee.

The Featherstone decision is a reminder that an accurate chronology of relevant events for employment decisions is crucial to the determination of what may or may not constitute unlawful conduct under the FEHA.

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April 21, 2017